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We perform quantum key distribution (QKD) in the presence of 4 classical channels in a C-band
dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) configuration using a commercial QKD system.
The classical channels are used for key distillation and 1 Gbps encrypted communication, rendering
the entire system independent from any other communication channel than a single dedicated fibre.
We successfully distil secret keys over fibre spans of up to 50 km. The separation between quantum
channel and nearest classical channel is only 200 GHz, while the classical channels are all separated
by 100 GHz. In addition to that we discuss possible improvements and alternative configurations,
for instance whether it is advantageous to choose the quantum channel at 1310 nm or to opt for a
pure C-band configuration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the initial proposal of quantum key distribution
(QKD) in 1984 [1] and its first experimental demonstra-
tion [2], major progresses in long-distance, fibre-based
point-to-point QKD have been achieved (for an overview
over current state-of-the-art implementations, see [3]).
Until recently, one of the specifics of QKD systems
was the need for a dedicated dark optical fibre, exclu-
sively reserved for the quantum channel (single photon
level). Signals of classical strength, used to perform key
distillation and encrypted communication between the
end users, were sent through a second fibre to not com-
promise the weak quantum signal.
The next consequential step towards larger availability
of QKD links is to look at the compatibility of QKD with
existing fibre infrastructure. Common public DWDM
(dense wavelength division multiplexing) networks mul-
tiplex up to 50 different wavelength channels on a single
fibre. If the quantum channel is launched into a fibre ac-
companied with other classical signals, several effects like
channel crosstalk, Raman scattering, four-wave mixing or
amplified spontaneous emission (in case of amplification
of the classical channels) can severely degrade QKD sys-
tem operation or worse, can prevent it at all.
First investigations in this direction were conducted by
Townsend in the late nineties [4]. The impact of a single
classical C-band channel, wavelength multiplexed with
a quantum channel at 1310 nm, was analyzed. Later,
in 2005, Lee and Wellbrock demonstrated quantum key
distribution, placing both the quantum channel and one
classical channel into the C-band with a separation of
down to 400 GHz equivalent to 3.2 nm [5]. We note
that the classical channel was neither linked to QKD
system operation nor used for encrypted communication.
More recent works [6, 7] investigate different impairment
sources on a more general level, including effects which
occur when more than one classical channel is present,
e.g. four-wave mixing.
Apart from the long term goal of QKD operation on
public DWDM networks, another frequently encountered
network topology could push forward QKD availability
on a short term scale. In order to accommodate future
growth, telecom companies have spent the last few years
installing point-to-point dedicated fibres. These fibres
can also be used in the standard configuration of QKD
using a dark fibre for the quantum channel and another
for the encrypted communication. However, for reasons
of availability and fibre leasing costs the operation on
only one fibre is highly desirable.
In this paper we investigate exactly this situation
where in total only one dedicated fibre is available and
an encrypted link, based on QKD, should be established
between its endpoints. This objective thus necessitates
the wavelength multiplexing of all system relevant chan-
nels, i.e. key distillation- and encrypted communication
channels as well as the quantum channel on a single fibre.
If one is not obliged to operate in a two fibre configura-
tion, then in particular QKD systems which require a
classical clock signal to synchronize the separate devices
would benefit from higher robustness against fibre drifts.
Furthermore, the configuration investigated here surely
bears the advantage of having perfect information on the
classical channels, while they are difficult to assess in the
public network configuration. Therefore a reliable perfor-
mance characterisation of the entire system is obtainable.
In our experiment we use a standard 8 channel C-band
DWDM with 100 GHz (corresponding to 0.8 nm) spac-
ing. We simultaneously multiplex 4 classical channels
(one bidirectional channel for distillation and encrypted
1 Gbps communication, respectively) with a quantum
channel, separated from the nearest classical channel by
only 200 GHz.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II we discuss
the different impairment sources relevant for our realiza-
tion. Section III describes the QKD setup and presents
the experimental results followed by a discussion and out-
look in Sec. IV. Section V contains our conclusions.
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FIG. 1: Measured effective Raman cross-section ρ (λ) (per km
fibre length and nm bandwidth) for a pump laser wavelength
centred at 1550 nm in a standard single mode fibre at room
temperature.
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FIG. 2: Zoom on Anti-Stokes dip of the Raman spectrum. In
channels +2 and +3 the minimal amount of Raman scatter is
found.
II. IMPAIRMENT SOURCES
A. Raman scattering
Due to photon-phonon interaction, photons can change
their wavelength and thus compromise other channels.
Depending on whether a phonon gets excited or de-
exited, photons at wavelengths above (Stokes) and be-
low (anti-Stokes) the initial wavelength are generated.
Scattering off acoustic phonons (Brillouin scattering) is
not critical, since the maximal frequency shift of the
scattered photons is small (10 GHz, in backward di-
rection) and therefore cannot reach adjacent channels
on a 100 GHz grid. By contrast, scattering off optical
phonons (Raman scattering) can lead to significant fre-
quency shifts covering the entire C-band [26], having an
intensity maximum at a shift of about 13 THz (corre-
sponding to a wavelength shift of 100 nm at 1550 nm).
Unlike acoustic phonons, the more or less flat dispersion
relation of optical phonons causes frequency shifts inde-
pendent of the scatter direction. This means that in co-
as well as in counter propagating direction (with respect
to the exciting signal) a broad spectrum of photons is
present.
We measured the Raman scatter generated by a 50
km standard single mode fibre and extracted an effective
Raman scattering cross-section ρ(λ), shown in Fig. 2. It
is normalized with respect to spectral bandwidth and fi-
bre length and accounts for the fibre caption ratio of the
scattered light. In return, by means of ρ(λ) and allowing
for fibre attenuation we can calculate the Raman scatter
power emerging from the input Pram,b (backward Raman
scattering) and output Pram,f (forward Raman scatter-
ing) of a fibre of arbitrary length L. Assuming a certain
filter pass-band [λ, λ+∆λ] and approximating the spec-
tral integration via
∫ λ+∆λ
λ
ρ(λ′)dλ′ ≈ ρ(λ) ·∆λ (1)
we obtain (see Appendix A)
Pram,f = Pout · L · ρ(λ) ·∆λ (2)
Pram,b = Pout ·
sinh(α · L)
α
· ρ(λ) ·∆λ (3)
where Pout is the power of the exciting laser at the fibre
output in [W], α the fibre attenuation coefficient [km−1]
and L the fibre length [km]. Pout can be written in terms
of the input power via Pout = Pin · e−α·L. The impact
of each of the Raman contributions, represented by the
detection probability per ns detector gate is depicted in
Fig. 3.
Note that we assume equal attenuation for initial and
scattered wavelength, which is reasonable for our total
wavelength span of 4 nm (see Sec. III).
B. Channel crosstalk
The relative strength of the classical channels requires
a large DWDM isolation with respect to the quantum
channel. As a reasonable benchmark for a sufficient iso-
lation we propose the detector dark count probability.
To calculate a typical value we need to consider the re-
ceiver sensitivity of the transceiver modules used for the
classical communication (see Sec. III). It conditions the
necessary optical power to ensure error free detection.
In our particular case the sensitivity which guaran-
tees a bit error rate BER < 10−12 is equal to -28 dBm
(Finisar FWLF-1631-xx). This power corresponds to ap-
proximately 1.2 · 104 photons per ns. In order to atten-
uate this photon number so that the detection probabil-
ity per ns gate is of order of the dark count probability
(5·10−6 ns−1) an isolation of about 80 dB is needed. Here
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FIG. 3: Different contributions to the total noise count prob-
ability per ns detector gate assuming our system param-
eters (DWDM channel isolation=82 dB, fibre loss αdB =
0.21 dB/km, 4 classical channels each with a power of -28 dBm
at the receiver, η = 0.07, internal components loss=2.65 dB).
we assume a detector efficiency of η = 0.07 and internal
components loss of 2.65 dB on Bob’s side.
Our standard 8-channel DWDM provides an isolation
of 82 dB between non-adjacent channels which is just suf-
ficient to match the before mentioned criteria, see Fig. 3.
In the case of insufficient isolation, additional filters can
further improve the isolation, however at the expense of
additional insertion loss in the quantum channel. In
particular, considering Raman scattering we find that
crosstalk is not a limiting factor for long fibre lengths.
Finally, we note that a sufficient isolation of the
co-propagating quantum and classical channel entails
that crosstalk from Rayleigh backscatter in a counter-
propagating configuration can be neglected.
C. Four-wave mixing
Four-wave mixing (FWM) is mediated by the third or-
der susceptibility χ(3) and describes the generation of ad-
ditional photon frequencies, different from those present
in the initial fields. In contrast to Raman scattering
no energy is transferred to or taken from the fibre, i.e.
no phonon excitation or de-excitation takes place. Most
harmful for our setup would be the degenerate case where
two exciting frequencies f1, f2 (assuming f1 > f2) gen-
erate side band frequencies f+ = f1 + (f1 − f2) and
f− = f2 − (f1 − f2). If the channel separation is not
properly chosen, f+/− may coincide with the quantum
channel pass-band. The generation efficiency depends on
the phase-matching condition, as well as on the relative
polarisation and propagation direction of the involved
field frequency components. It is particularly easy to ful-
fil around the zero dispersion wavelength, where it can
corrupt even classical communication [8]. In Sec. III we
present a channel configuration which prevents efficient
FWM generation, independent of the fibre type (SSMF,
DSF or NZDSF).
In addition to the stimulated case described before, it
is also important to assess the noise contribution from
spontaneous FWM. Spontaneous FWM allows the cre-
ation of signal and idler frequencies fs, fi from each
pump frequency fp, satisfying energy conservation via
2fp = fs + fi. The efficient generation again depends on
the phase-matching condition. Around the zero disper-
sion wavelength the generated spectrum can be rather
broad, superposing the spectrum generated by Raman
scattering [9]. Following [9] we calculate that even in our
most demanding configuration the γP0L product is very
small (= 0.002, for considerable contributions at least
γP0L of about 0.1 is needed). This indicates that even
when we were operating around the zero dispersion wave-
length, spontaneous FWM can be neglected with respect
to Raman scattering.
III. EXPERIMENT
A. Setup
For the experiments we adopt a commercial QKD sys-
tem (Cerberis from idQuantique [10]). As outlined in
Fig. 4, this solution combines a QKD server for secure
point-to-point key distribution, and Layer 2 encryption
units to encode and decode messages with the key pro-
vided by the quantum server for complete secure bidi-
rectional communication between two distant partners,
Alice and Bob.
The QKD layer is based on a “plug & play” phase
encoding quantum key distribution system where all op-
tical and mechanical fluctuations are automatically and
passively compensated [11]. Bob generates a sequence of
optical pulses with a frequency of frep = 5 MHz. It prop-
agates through his unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter such that each pulse is split into two orthogonally po-
larized pulses which are separated by the interferometer
imbalance. The sequence length is chosen to match twice
the length of the storage line of Ls ≈ 10 km at Alice’s
in order to avoid compromising Rayleigh backscatter. At
Alice’s, the major proportion of photons per pulse is used
to trigger the classical detector DA in order to synchro-
nize her device with Bob’s. The remaining proportion is
reflected at the Faraday mirror (FM), phase modulated
by φA in accordance to Alice’s choice of bit value and
encoding base, attenuated by the variable optical atten-
uator (VOA) to µ photons per pulse and returned to Bob
through the same fibre link. Due to the Faraday rotation,
each pulse propagates along the contrary interferometer
arm as before and interferes at the beam splitter (BS) in
accordance to the phase difference between φA and Bob’s
base choice φB. All internal losses of Bob’s optical com-
ponents sum up to tB = 2.65 dB (excluding DWDMs
and optional filters).
The signals are detected by InGaAs avalanche photo
diodes (APDs) operated in Geiger mode. The APDs are
4FIG. 4: Setup scheme. APD: Avalanche photo diode, BS: Beam splitter, C: Circulator, D: Photo diode, F: Spectral filter
(optional), FM: Faraday mirror, PBS: Polarizing beam splitter, VOA: Variable optical attenuator, φ: Phase modulator.
temperature stabilized at 220 K, gated using 1.5 ns long
gates and with a dead time of τdead = 10 µs applied af-
ter each detection to reduce the afterpulse probability to
pap ≈ 0.008. Their detection efficiencies are η ≈ 0.07
at a dark count probability of pdc ≈ 5 · 10−6 ns−1. Af-
ter key sifting, optionally via the sifting protocols BB84
or SARG [12], followed by fully implemented error cor-
rection using the CASCADE algorithm [13] and privacy
amplification using hashing functions based on Toeplitz
matrices [14], Alice and Bob remain with shared secret
keys. The integrity of the public distillation communica-
tion is ensured by a Wegman-Carter-type authentication
scheme based on universal hashing functions [15].
The pair of Ethernet encryptors is periodically updated
with the secret keys to establish a permanent AES-256
encrypted 1 Gbps data link between Alice and Bob. The
data to be encrypted are continuously provided by two
1 Gbps streams of random bits from a network test sys-
tem (EXFO PacketBlazer FTB-8510). We note that typ-
ically the key refresh rate is once per minute which re-
quires a secret key rate of at least 8.6 bps. In order to
guarantee continuous operation the key refresh rate is
temporarily reduced if the secret key rate drops below
that limit.
All in all, to completely operate the Cerberis system,
four classical communication channels have to be set up
between Alice and Bob in addition to the quantum chan-
nel. The bidirectional communication for distillation, i.e.
key sifting, error correction and privacy amplification,
demands two authenticated channels, one from Alice to
Bob and one from Bob to Alice. Similarly, two channels
are required for the bidirectional encrypted data trans-
mission between the encryptors. All classical commu-
nication channels are implemented using standard opti-
cal 2.67 Gbps DWDM SFP transceivers (Finisar FWLF-
1631-xx).
We multiplex the quantum channel along with the four
classical channels using off-the-shelf 100 GHz DWDM
modules (OptiWorks). The modules possess an inser-
tion loss of 1.95 dB and an isolation of 59 dB (82 dB)
for adjacent (non-adjacent) channels. The implemented
channel configuration is shown in Fig. 4. For the quan-
tum channel we choose a wavelength of 1551.72 nm on
the ITU C-band grid. We take advantage of 10 % less
Raman noise on the anti-Stokes side of the Raman spec-
trum at ambient temperature (see Fig. 2) by placing all
classical channels at higher wavelengths. To benefit from
both, the considerably higher DWDM channel isolation
for non-adjacent channels as well as from lower Raman
noise we omit the adjacent channel and set up the quan-
tum channel 200 GHz (1.6 nm) apart from the nearest
classical channel. We minimize the direct impairment
due to FWM by choosing the frequency difference be-
tween two co-propagating channels such that no FWM
frequency product is generated within the quantum chan-
nel pass-band (see Sec. II C).
The discussion of impairment sources has shown that
in general the amount of noise impinging on the detec-
tors increases with the total power present in the fibre.
Hence, we reduce the power of the classical channels to
the overall transmission losses using variable optical at-
tenuators (VOA), such that the corresponding power at
the receiver’s end just matches the receiver sensitivity of
-28 dBm. This corresponds to Pout = −26.05 dBm in
Eq. 2, 3 due to the insertion losses of our DWDM mod-
ules.
With the aim to further minimize the amount of Ra-
man noise, we optionally add phase-shifted fibre Bragg
grating filters (F) from aos [16] centred around the quan-
tum channel wavelength in front of each APD. Their
spectral bandwidth of 45 pm (fwhm) and extinction ra-
tio of 14 dB entails a 85 % rejection of noise photons,
outweighing the additional attenuation of 2 dB due to
insertion loss. The filters are actively and indepen-
dently temperature stabilized using standard tempera-
ture controllers, mainly to permit fine adjustment of their
transmission bandwidth. A straightforward configura-
tion with only one filter inserted between the PBS and
the DWDM was abandoned because of back reflections
of the quantum channel laser which completely saturated
the APDs.
5Fibre length 1 km 5 km 10 km 25 km 35 km 41 km 50 km
Without filters
Rsec [bps] BB84/SARG 2829/- 2047/- 1524/- 134/511 4.3/72 -/2.0
QBER [%] BB84/SARG 0.57/- 0.72/- 1.18/- 4.53/2.12 8.60/4.77 -/7.48
With filters
Rsec [bps] BB84/SARG 251/347 25/128 7.5/43 0/11
QBER [%] BB84/SARG 1.6/1.7 3.6/2.5 6.7/3.7 34.5/5.4
TABLE I: The secret key rate Rsec and QBER values from Fig. 5, which we obtained experimentally using BB84 and SARG,
without and with the spectral filters (F).
B. Results
We characterize the system performance for different
fibre lengths by measuring the quantum bit error rate
QBER and the secret key rate Rsec. The QBER, i.e.
the number of erroneous detections over the total number
of detections, can be approximated by
QBER = QBERopt +QBERdet +QBERwdm (4)
(for more details see VII B). The optical share QBERopt
is determined by the interference visibility entailed by the
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FIG. 5: Performance of the QKD based encryption system in
terms of QBER (top) and secret key rate provided to the en-
cryptors (bottom) in dependence of the fibre length. Symbols
denote our experimental results, solid lines our calculations.
Additional filtering increases the maximum fibre length to
41 km using BB84 key sifting and 50 km using SARG.
quality of the optical components and their alignment.
Its typical value was 0.3 % (0.6 %) using BB84 (SARG).
QBERdet depends on the characteristics of Bob’s sin-
gle photon detectors and includes errors due to detector
dark counts of around 5 · 10−6 per ns as well as after-
pulses. QBERwdm summarizes all additional errors from
noise due to wavelength-division multiplexing with clas-
sical channels, i.e. channel crosstalk and Raman scatter
(see Fig. 3).
The secret key rate, i.e. the net rate of secret key bits
provided to the encryptors to cipher data communication
between Alice and Bob, is given by [17]
Rsec = Rsift (1− rec) (1− rpa) . (5)
Here, Rsift is the detection rate after sifting (Eq. 15),
and rec and rpa are the fractions of bits used for error
correction and privacy amplification. Both, rec and rpa,
increase non-linearly with the QBER.
Our performance results in terms ofQBER (estimated
by the CASCADE error correction protocol) and net rate
of secret keys are plotted in Fig. 5 and listed in Tab. I.
The solid lines indicate our calculations which make use
of the formulas given in VIIB. We note that we do not
account for the time needed for key distillation and fibre
length measurements, which gets the more significant the
higher the key rates. Hence, in general we overestimate
the secret key rate especially for short fibre lengths. The
dashed lines in Fig. 5 indicate the maximum QBER of
9 % below which the system can distil a secret key, and
the minimum secret key rate of 8.6 bps required for AES
encryption with 256 bit keys which are updated once a
minute, respectively.
Without the optional spectral filters (F) we obtain a
secret key rate which remains well above 1000 bps up to
a fibre length of 10 km using BB84 key sifting. Inserting
the optional spectral filters in front of the APDs does not
only increase the secret key rate from 4.3 bps to 25 bps
for a fibre length of 35 km, it also increases the maximal
distance to 41 km at which we obtain 7.5 bps. We achieve
a further increase in the secret key rate and maximum
distance if we use the SARG key sifting protocol instead.
Here, the average secret key rate is 128 bps for 35 km
and 11 bps for 50 km fibre length. We emphasize that
the SARG protocol equally guarantees the security of
the key material. While for BB84 the optimum mean
photon number µ of the quantum pulses depends on the
6fibre transmission t according to µBB84 = t, the SARG
protocol allows to benefit from a higher mean photon
number µSARG = 2 ·
√
t [18].
Concerning the stability of the setup we verified con-
stant detection and secret key rates over a period as long
as five days in the configuration without the additional
filters (F). Having added the filters we still observe a con-
stant detection rate in one detector which confirms that
a sufficient stabilisation of the filter transmission spec-
tra can be achieved using standard temperature control.
However, after a few hours the detection rate in the sec-
ond detector tends to decrease due to a drift of the trans-
mission spectra of the corresponding filter, most likely
caused by a filter fabrication flaw.
IV. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
In Fig. 5 (left) we compare the QBER values obtained
experimentally with theoretical calculations which take
all discussed noise sources into account. It reproduces
very well the measurement results giving us confidence
that we have successfully identified the dominant impair-
ment sources present in our implementation. Based on
this we discuss some alternative configurations in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
Firstly, we address the question whether or not it might
be advantageous to place the quantum channel in the O-
band around 1310 nm while keeping the classical commu-
nication channels in the C-band around 1550 nm (for an
O-band implementation see [19]). The maximal reach of
the 1550 nm solution is ultimately limited by the Raman
noise (see Fig. 3). Calculating the mean phonon occupa-
tion numbers we find that the Raman noise at 1310 nm
is about 4000 times weaker as at 1550 nm. We calculate
two scenarios: firstly, we take the dark count probability
of the detectors used in our experiment (straight lines,
pdc = 5 · 10−6 ns−1, η = 0.07) and secondly, we assume a
very small detector dark count probability (dashed lines,
pdc = 5 · 10−8 ns−1, η = 0.07). In addition to that we
suppose a better channel isolation in the 1310 nm case of
100 dB while it is at 82 dB in the 1550 nm case (like in
our experiment). The results are shown in Fig. 6. For all
curves we neglected the influence of detector dead time,
the system specific duty cycle and the reduced efficiency
of the error correction protocol (see VIIB). As expected,
we find that the lower dark count rate dramatically im-
proves the 1310 nm curve, whereas it has rather minor
impact on the 1550 nm. However, we see that if high key
rates are desired, the 1310 nm solution cannot keep up
with the 1550 nm one due to the higher fibre attenuation.
Only in an extreme case where lower key rates are accept-
able, the 1310 nm solution can reach a larger distance,
provided detectors with very low dark count probability
are used.
Secondly, we want to estimate the implications of
higher transmission rates in the encrypted channels. As
described before, we minimize the total power present in
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FIG. 6: Comparison between 1550 nm and 1310 nm quantum
channel wavelength (SARG, with filters). pdc denotes detec-
tor dark count probability. The assumed fibre attenuation is
α1550 = 0.21 dB/km and α1310 = 0.35 dB/km. The calcu-
lations for a dark fibre configuration (without DWDMs and
filters) is also shown for comparison.
the fibre by adapting the laser power of the SFP mod-
ules to their receiver sensitivity of -28 dBm. Modules
designated for higher transmission rates currently have
lower sensitivity. For example, the 10 Gbps transceiver
module Finisar FTRX-1811-3 is specified with a receiver
sensitivity of -23 dBm. Using two of these modules for
the encrypted link instead of the 1 Gbps modules we used
would consequently increase the total classical power by
3.2 dB, and hence the detected noise. Taking this into
account but keeping all other parameters unchanged, we
estimate for distances up to 40 km no significant degra-
dation of the secret key rate. However, the maximum
distance at which a key rate of 8.6 bps can be achieved,
reduces by 4-5 km, depending on the sifting protocol.
Next, we take a look on possible measures which could
improve the performance of the current setup. One possi-
bility is the reduction of the total classical channel power.
This could be achieved by amplification of the classical
signals in front of the receivers, or by prospective SFP
modules with better receiver sensitivity. While a solution
with amplifiers is cost-intensive, an improvement of the
receiver sensitivity of more than 3 dB is unlikely in near
future. One could also assume that narrower spectral or
temporal filtering of the quantum channel could further
reduce the impact of Raman noise. However, we observe
that there is no more room for improvements here. On
one hand the transmission width of 45 pm (corresponding
to 5.6 GHz) of our additional filter is already the limit
for the spectral width of our sub-nanosecond quantum
signals. On the other hand, we can not further reduce
the temporal gate width without clipping the pulses and,
hence, introducing additional losses. Since the pulse du-
ration of the quantum signals is related to the inverse of
its spectral bandwidth, further narrower temporal filter-
ing would entail broader spectral filtering and vice versa.
Finally, we would like to give an outlook on prospective
7DWDM implementations with next-generation QKD sys-
tems based on the Differential-phase shift protocol [20]
or the Coherent-one-way protocol (COW, [21]). These
systems largely benefit from high speed electronics and
a better key generation efficiency due to their improved
tolerance to photon number splitting attacks. As an il-
lustration we take a look at the COW prototype as pre-
sented in [22], which uses a QKD encoding frequency
of 312.5 MHz and a mean photon number of µCOW =
0.5 photons per pulse. Assuming the same parameters
as used for the calculations with the additional filters in
Fig. 5 we find an increase in the maximum link distance
to 70 km and a secret key rate of > 10,000 bps for fibre
lengths up to 43 km.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrate that a QKD based encryption system
can be efficiently operated on a single dedicated fibre
of up to 50 km length. All four classical channels neces-
sary to establish the encrypted link are multiplexed along
with the quantum signal in a 100 GHz DWDM config-
uration, rendering the system independent of any addi-
tional network connection. We also show that a combined
O-band/C-band solution (quantum channel at 1310 nm)
cannot improve the performance.
We find that with respect to the conventional dark fibre
configuration, requiring two independent fibres, compa-
rable secret key rates can be obtained, e.g. up to 25 km
the decrease of the secret key rate is less than 50 %.
We conclude that with only moderate additional efforts
a commercial QKD system can be upgraded to network
topologies where only one dedicated fibre is available at
a time.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Raman Scatter power formulas
The Raman Scatter power dPram at wavelength λ from
a fibre element of length dx at position x when a power
Pin is launched into a fibre is
dPram(λ, x) = Pin · e−α·x · ρ(λ) ·∆λ · dx (6)
ρ(λ) accounts already for the fibre caption ratio and we
used the same approximation for the spectral integral
(see Eq. 1). The scatter from a single fibre element is
almost isotropic. Now we have to account for the fibre
attenuation (fibre length L) when the scatter propagates
to the fibre output (forward scatter) and back to the fibre
input (backward scatter)
a) forward :
dPram,f = dPram(λ, x) · e−α·(L−x) (7)
integrating over whole fibre
⇒ Pram,f = Pin · e−α·L · ρ(λ) ·∆λ (8)
b) backward :
dPram,b = dPram(λ, x) · e−α·x (9)
integrating over whole fibre
⇒ Pram,b = Pin · e−α·x ·
sinh(α · L)
α
· ρ(λ) ·∆λ (10)
In order to obtain the detection probabilities per gate
(pram,f and pram,b respectively), used for the QBER cal-
culation (see Appendix B), we calculate
pram,f =
Pram,f
hν
· η ·∆tgate (11)
where ∆tgate is the gate duration and η the detector effi-
ciency. By replacing Pram,f by Pram,b, one obtains pram,b
in the same manner.
B. Explicit QBER and key rate formulas
The general definition of QBER is given by the ratio
between the number of false detections and total detec-
tions (right+false):
QBER =
false
right+ false
(12)
Introducing a sifting protocol specific parameter β which
is βBB84 = 1 for BB84 and βSARG =
2−V
2 for SARG we
obtain
QBER =
1
2
· pµ(1− V ) + 2 · pdc + pAP + pram + pct
β · pµ + 2 · pdc + pAP + pram + pct
(13)
where every quantity signifies a detection probability per
detector gate. In particular : pµ = signal detection, pdc
= dark count, pAP = after pulse, pram = pram,f +pram,b
= Raman photon detection (see Eq. 11), pct = cross talk
photon detection and V is the interference visibility. The
signal detection probability pµ is a product of the aver-
age number of photons per pulse µ, fibre transmission
t, detector efficiency η and tB the loss of Bob’s internal
components. The optimal µ also depends on the sifting
protocol, it is µBB84 = t and µSARG = 2 ·
√
t.
We estimate the secret key rate after error correction
and privacy amplification by
Rsec = Rsift (IAB − IAE) . (14)
8Here, Rsift is the sifted bit rate,
Rsift =
1
2 (β · pµ + 2pdc + pAP + pram + pct) · frep · ηduty
1 + τdead (pµ + 2pdc + pAP + pram + pct) · frep
,
(15)
where frep is the pulse repetition frequency and ηduty =
LS
L+2LS
accounts for the duty cycle of our system with
L the fibre length and LS the length of Alice’s storage
line. We note, that Eq. 15 does not account for double
detections and Poissonian photon number statistics.
During error correction and privacy amplification,
Rsift is reduced by a factor (IAB − IAE). IAB and IAE
are the mutual information per bit between Alice and
Bob, and between Alice and a potential eavesdropper,
respectively. Due to quantum bit errors, IAB is smaller
than 1 and amounts to
IAB = 1− ηec ·H (QBER) , (16)
with H (p) = −p log2 p − (1− p) log2 (1− p) the binary
entropy function. In the ideal case, the amount of bits
discarded during error correction is given by the Shannon
limit, i.e. ηec = 1. In practice, however, we observe that
the implemented algorithm for CASCADE error correc-
tion consumes about 20 % more bits than given by the
Shannon limit. Hence, we correct Eq. 16 by choosing
ηCascadeec =
6
5 .
To calculate the information per bit IAE between Alice
and an eavesdropper we assume that an eavesdropper has
full control over the quantum channel (i.e. the visibility
and fibre transmission). In contrast, he can not modify
the characteristics of Bob’s detectors. Additionally, we
suppose that he performs an optimal coherent attack [23]
on pulses containing one photon, and a PNS attack [24]
if more than one photon is present in a pulse (without
affecting the total detection rate at Bob). For BB84 with
weak laser pulses one then obtains [25]
IAE,BB84 =
(
1− µ2t
)
(1−H (P )) + µ2t
1 + 2pdcµtη
(17)
with P = 12 +
√
D (1−D), D = 1−V2−µ/t . Based on the
same assumptions, we use the results in [18] to estimate
for the SARG protocol
IAE,SARG = Ipns (1) +
1
12
µ2
t
e−µ (1− Ipns (1)) , (18)
where Ipns(k) = 1−H(12+ 12
√
1− 1
2k
) is the potential in-
formation gain of an eavesdropper due to PNS attacks on
multi-photon pulses when k photons are split and stored.
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